Optimal discretionary policy and uncertainty about inflation persistence by Moessner, Richhild
WORKING PAPER SERIES







OPTIMAL DISCRETIONARYIn 2005 all ECB 
publications 
will feature 




NO. 540 / NOVEMBER 2005
This paper can be downloaded without charge from 
http://www.ecb.int or from the Social Science Research Network 








1   I would like to thank Bill Allen,Andy Levin,Daniel Levy,Frank Smets,David Vestin,an anonymous referee,participants of the
Eurosystem’s Inflation Persistence Network and seminar participants at the Bank for International Settlements for helpful
comments and discussions.This paper was prepared while working in the Directorate General Research of the European
Central Bank.The paper represents the views and analysis of the author and should not be thought to represent those of 
the Bank of England or the European Central Bank.
2  European Central Bank and Bank of England,Threadneedle Street,London,EC2R 8AH,United Kingdom;
e-mail:richhild.moessner@bankofengland.co.uk
EUROSYSTEM INFLATION 
PERSISTENCE NETWORK© European Central Bank, 2005
Address
Kaiserstrasse 29
60311 Frankfurt am Main, Germany
Postal address
Postfach 16 03 19
60066 Frankfurt am Main, Germany
Telephone




+49 69 1344 6000
Telex
411 144 ecb d
All rights reserved.
Any reproduction, publication and
reprint in the form of a different
publication, whether printed or
produced electronically, in whole or in
part, is permitted only with the explicit
written authorisation of the ECB or the
author(s).
The views expressed in this paper do not
necessarily reflect those of the European
Central Bank.
The statement of purpose for the ECB
Working Paper Series is available from
the ECB website, http://www.ecb.int.
ISSN 1561-0810 (print)
ISSN 1725-2806 (online)
The Eurosystem Inflation Persistence Network 
 
This paper reflects research conducted within the Inflation Persistence Network (IPN), a 
team of Eurosystem economists undertaking joint research on inflation persistence in the 
euro area and in its member countries. The research of the IPN combines theoretical and 
empirical analyses using three data sources: individual consumer and producer prices; 
surveys on firms’ price-setting practices; aggregated sectoral, national and area-wide 
price indices. Patterns, causes and policy implications of inflation persistence are 
addressed. 
 
Since June 2005 the IPN is chaired by Frank Smets; Stephen Cecchetti (Brandeis 
University), Jordi Galí (CREI, Universitat Pompeu Fabra) and Andrew Levin (Board of 
Governors of the Federal Reserve System) act as external consultants and Gonzalo 
Camba-Méndez as Secretary. 
 
The refereeing process is co-ordinated by a team composed of Günter Coenen 
(Chairman), Stephen Cecchetti, Silvia Fabiani, Jordi Galí, Andrew Levin, and Gonzalo 
Camba-Méndez. The paper is released in order to make the results of IPN research 
generally available, in preliminary form, to encourage comments and suggestions prior to 
final publication. The views expressed in the paper are the author’s own and do not 
necessarily reflect those of the Eurosystem. 
 3
ECB







3 Uncertainty about inflation inertia and
optimal discretionary policy 11






European Central Bank working paper series 30Abstract
This paper studies optimal discretionary policy with parameter
uncertainty about inﬂation inertia. Optimal policy rules and impulse
responses are presented within a hybrid New-Keynesian model esti-
mated for the euro area by Smets (2003). We ﬁnd that it may be
optimal for policy to respond more aggressively to cost-push shocks
ﬂation inertia, depending on the form of the central bank’s objective
function. Moreover, in the cases where optimal policy is not certainty
equivalent, we ﬁnd that inﬂation returns slightly more gradually to
equilibrium following a shock when the degree of inﬂation inertia is
uncertain.
JEL classiﬁcation: E52, E58
Key words: monetary policy; inﬂation persistence; uncertainty.
and real interest rate shocks in the presence of uncertainty about in-
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The question of how monetary policy should be set optimally when the struc-
ture of the economy exhibits inﬂation inertia is important for policy makers,
since the degree of inﬂation inertia is a key parameter for assessing the op-
timality of monetary policies. A research network of economists from the
national central banks of the euro area and the ECB have recently been in-
vestigating the empirical evidence for inﬂation persistence, its determinants
and implications for monetary policy. Since there is little consensus about
the degree of endogenous inﬂation persistence in the empirical literature,
it is therefore of particular interest to study optimal policy when there is
uncertainty about inﬂation inertia.
This paper studies optimal monetary policy under discretion with para-
meter uncertainty about inﬂation inertia, assuming that the policy maker
has a prior probability distribution of the parameter and sets policy to mini-
mize the expected loss based on this prior distribution. Optimal policy rules
and impulse responses are presented within a hybrid New-Keynesian model
estimated for the euro area by Smets (2003).
We ﬁnd that it may be optimal for policy to respond more aggressively to
cost-push shocks and real interest rate shocks in the presence of uncertainty
about inﬂation inertia, depending on the form of the central bank’s objec-
tive function. Moreover, in the cases where optimal policy is not certainty-
equivalent, we ﬁnd that inﬂation returns slightly more gradually to equilib-
rium following a shock, with the speed of convergence decreasing slightly
with uncertainty about inﬂation inertia.
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The question of how monetary policy should be set optimally when the struc-
ture of the economy exhibits inﬂation persistence is important for policy
makers. A research network of economists from the national central banks of
the euro area and the ECB have been investigating the empirical evidence for
inﬂation persistence, its determinants and implications for monetary policy
(see Angeloni et al. (2004) for a summary). The degree of endogenous inﬂa-
tion persistence is a key parameter for assessing the optimality of monetary
policies. For example, Levin and Williams (2003) show that monetary policy
rules which are optimal in a forward-looking model can perform badly in
backward-looking models. Since there is little consensus about the degree of
endogenous inﬂation persistence in the empirical literature, it is therefore of
particular interest to study optimal policy when there is uncertainty about
inﬂation inertia.
This paper studies optimal discretionary monetary policy with parame-
ter uncertainty about inﬂation inertia, within a forward-looking hybrid New-
Keynesian model of the economy commonly used for monetary policy analy-
sis.1 In contrast to Söderström (2002), who considers the implications of
uncertainty about inﬂation inertia within a purely backward-looking model,
and Onatski and Williams (2003), who also consider a purely backward-
looking model, this paper studies a forward-looking model. In contrast to
Kimura and Kurozumi (2003), who study uncertainty about inﬂation inertia
for the case of optimal monetary policy under commitment, and Onatski and
Williams (2003), who study optimised Taylor-type policy rules, we consider
the eﬀects of uncertainty about inﬂation inertia for optimal policy under
discretion. Moreover, we consider ad hoc objective functions for the cen-
tral bank, rather than micro-founded objective functions as in Kimura and
Kurozumi (2003).2
We model parameter uncertainty about inﬂation inertia by assuming that
the policy maker has a prior probability distribution of the parameter, and
sets policy to minimize the expected loss based on this prior distribution.3 A
1See Clarida, Gali and Gertler (1999) for monetary policy analysis using hybrid New-
Keynesian models.
2An overview of the implications for monetary policy design of inﬂation persistence,
and of uncertainty about it, is presented in Levin and Moessner (2005), for both ad hoc
and micro-founded objective functions.
3This approach does not incorporate the implications of gradual learning about the
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uncertainty is Brainard (1967), who found for static models that it is opti-
mal for policy to react with greater caution in the presence of uncertainty
about the impact of policy. By contrast, Craine (1979) found for a dynamic
backward-looking model that optimal policy may become more aggressive
in the presence of uncertainty about the transition dynamics. Another ap-
proach to investigating the implications of uncertainty is to study the eﬀect
of setting policy based on parameter values that are incorrect, but taken as
certain in the central bank’s optimisation problem.4
We derive optimal policy under discretion in the presence of uncertainty
about inﬂation inertia by extending the solution method of Backus and Drif-
ﬁll (1986) for optimal discretionary policy to the case with parameter uncer-
tainty. Optimal policy and impulse responses to cost-push and real interest
rate shocks are determined within a hybrid New-Keynesian model estimated
for the euro area by Smets (2003).
We ﬁnd that it may be optimal for policy to respond more aggressively to
cost-push shocks and real interest rate shocks in the presence of uncertainty
about inﬂation inertia, depending on the form of the central bank’s objective
function. If the central bank’s objective is to minimise inﬂation and output
gap volatility, and if it also has concern for interest rate volatility or interest
rate smoothing, then the optimal policy response to both cost-push shocks
and real interest rate shocks is more aggressive in the presence of uncertainty
about inﬂation inertia. If the central bank only cares about inﬂation and
output gap volatility, however, then the optimal policy response to cost-
push shocks is more aggressive in the presence of uncertainty about inﬂation
inertia, while the optimal response to real interest rate shocks is the same as
in the case of certainty. Finally, if the central bank’s objective function only
penalizes inﬂation volatility, then the optimal policy response to both cost-
push shocks and real interest rate shocks does not depend on uncertainty
about inﬂation inertia. Moreover, in the cases where optimal policy is not
certainty equivalent, we ﬁnd that inﬂation returns slightly more gradually to
equilibrium following a shock, with the speed of convergence decreasing with
uncertainty about inﬂation inertia.
structural parameters of the economy, which has been considered in the context of optimal
policy for example in Wieland (2000), Beck and Wieland (2002) and Orphanides and
Williams (2005).
4See Walsh (2003), Angeloni, Coenen and Smets (2003), Coenen (2003), and Walsh
(2004) for analysis using such an approach of misspeciﬁcation.
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with the result of Söderström (2002), who ﬁnds that it is optimal for policy
to respond more aggressively to cost-push shocks when the central bank’s
objective function penalizes inﬂation and output volatility,5 but that the re-
sponse is certainty-equivalent if it only penalizes inﬂation volatility. Also as
in Söderström (2002), we ﬁnd that the optimal policy response to real inter-
est rate shocks is certainty-equivalent if the central bank cares only about
inﬂation volatility. However, our result of a certainty-equivalent response to
real rate shocks when the central bank cares about both inﬂation and output
volatility diﬀers from Söderström (2002), who ﬁnds that a more aggressive re-
sponse to demand shocks is optimal in that case. This diﬀerence is probably
due to the fact that Söderström (2002) considers a purely backward-looking
model which assumes the existence of a lag in the monetary policy transmis-
sion mechanism, with monetary policy aﬀecting the output gap with a lag of
one period, in contrast to the forward-looking model considered here.
Our ﬁnding of a more aggressive response to real interest rate shocks when
the central bank also cares about interest rate volatility is in line with Kimura
and Kurozumi’s (2003) ﬁndings for optimal policy under commitment. They
ﬁnd within micro-founded models of inﬂation inertia and micro-founded loss
functions (rather than ad hoc loss functions considered in this paper), with
an added concern for interest rate volatility, that the optimal policy response
to shocks to the natural real interest rate is more aggressive in the presence of
uncertainty about inﬂation inertia.6 We also ﬁnd as in Kimura and Kurozumi
(2003) that inﬂation returns slightly more gradually to equilibrium following
a real interest rate shock when the central bank has a concern for interest
rate volatility.
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 describes the model of the
economy, Section 3 describes the method used for determining optimal dis-
cretionary policy under uncertainty and presents the results. Finally, Section
4 concludes.
5See also Srour (1999) and Shuetrim and Thompson (1999).
6Kimura and Kurozumi (2003) also include a term penalizing interest rate volatility
in the central bank’s objective function, motivated by considerations outside their model,
such as a desire to avoid the zero bound on nominal interest rates.
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We present results for optimal policy and impulse responses in the pres-
ence of uncertainty about inﬂation inertia within the following hybrid New-
Keynesian model estimated for the euro area by Smets (2003),
πt = αyt + φπt−1 +( 1− φ)Etπt+1 + eut, (1)
yt = −γ(it − Etπt+1)+θyt−1 +( 1− θ)Etyt+1 + egt. (2)
The variables πt, yt and it denote deviations of the inﬂation rate, out-
put and the short-term nominal interest rate from their steady-state values.
Without endogenous persistence, equation (1) can be derived from optimis-
ing microeconomic behaviour of price-setting ﬁrms, with the assumption of
monopolistic competition and sticky prices (see for example Goodfriend and
King (1997), Rotemberg and Woodford (1997)), and equation (2) can be
derived from an intertemporal consumption Euler equation. Equations (1)
and (2) also include lagged output and inﬂation terms. The lagged inﬂation
term in equation (1) may be motivated by the presence of partial price index-
ations (see Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (2001), Sbordone (2002)) or
the presence of rule-of-thumb price-setters (see Gali and Gertler (1999)). The
lagged output term in equation (2) may be motivated by habit persistence
in consumption or the presence of rule-of-thumb consumers (see Campbell
and Mankiw (1989), Fuhrer (2000)). There are two exogenous shocks in this
model, a shock eut to the inﬂation equation, and a shock egt to the output
equation,
eut+1 = ρueut + ηut+1,e gt+1 = ρgegt + ηgt+1, (3)
which are assumed to be serially uncorrelated. This is achieved by setting the
autocorrelations of the shocks, ρu and ρg, to very small values (see Table A) .
This allows us to study the implications of endogenous inﬂation persistence,
rather than of persistence generated by exogenous shocks. Estimates of the
model parameters for the euro area are given in Table A, where φ is the degree
of endogenous inﬂation peristence, θ is the degree of endogenous output
persistence, α is the slope of the New-Keynesian Phillips curve, γ is the
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In order to solve for optimal policy in the presence of uncertainty about
inﬂation inertia, we extend the approach for the case of certainty of Backus
and Driﬃll (1986) (see also Söderlind (1999)), which is based on a formulation
























Here, the vector of endogenous variables, xt, has been divided into predeter-
mined variables, x1t =[ yt−1,πt−1,e gt,e ut]
0,a n dj u m pv a r i a b l e s ,x2t =[ yt,πt]
0 ;
ut is the vector of control variables, the nominal interest rate it.T h ee r r o r s
εt+1 are assumed to be i.i.d. shocks with zero mean, whose covariance ma-





is time-invariant, and which are uncorrelated with the
predetermined variables x1t; 0n2x1 i saz e r om a t r i xo fs i z en2x1.T h em a t r i c e s
of the hybrid New-Keynesian model for the euro area (see equations (1) to












































































We can see that only the two matrices of equations (7) and (8) depend on
t h ed e g r e eo fi n ﬂation inertia, while the remaining matrices do not depend
on it.
3U n c e r t a i n t y a b o u t i n ﬂation inertia and op-
timal discretionary policy
The central bank minimises the expected discounted current and future val-









conditional on its information set, It, which does not include the actual value
o ft h ed e g r e eo fi n ﬂation inertia, φ.The objective function of the central bank









penalizing the volatility of inﬂation around target and the volatility of the
output gap, assigning a relative weight, λ
y, to output gap stabilisation, and
allowing for the possibility of a concern for interest rate volatility on the part
of the central bank, with a relative weight, λ
i, which may be zero or nonzero.











with appropriate constant matrices Q,U and R.
We model uncertainty about inﬂation inertia, φ, by assuming that the
central bank has a uniform prior probability distribution for φ over the in-
terval [¯ φ − ∆, ¯ φ + ∆],w i t hm e a n¯ φ =0 .48 equal to the estimated value
(see Table A). The parameter ∆ therefore quantiﬁes the degree of unertainty
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ECB
Working Paper Series No. 540
November 2005about inﬂation inertia. This allows us to explore whether optimal policy is
certainty-equivalent or not. We approximate the central bank’s uniform prior
probability distribution by a discrete probability distribution with n = 101
discrete values, φ
j = ¯ φ+j ∆
k ,j= −k,...,k ,a n dk = n−1
2 , with each discrete
value assigned the same probability of πj ≡ π(φ
j)= 1
n,s ot h a t
Pn
j=1 πj =1 .
The private sector is assumed to know the actual value for the degree of
inﬂation inertia, equal to the estimated value of ¯ φ =0 .48.
The solution of rational expectations models with partial information,
where the current value of some variables are unobserved, has been considered
in Pearlman, Currie and Levine (1986), Pearlman (1992) and Svensson and
Woodford (2002). Following Pearlman (1992), the Bellman equation for the
case of partial information in our case of uncertainty about inﬂation inertia
may be written as
v(xt)=m i n
ut
{E[L(xt,u t) | It]+βE[v(xt+1) | It]}, (12)
s u b j e c tt oe q u a t i o n s( 4 )a b o v e ,a n dt a k i ng private-sector expectations and
x1t as given. In the presence of parameter uncertainty, the central bank’s
information set It does not contain the degree of endogenous inﬂation per-
sistence φ, and the central bank therefore needs to form expectations over it,
based on its uniform prior probability distribution.
3.1 Solution method
We assume that the optimal feedback rule depends linearly on predetermined
variables, and that the value function is a quadratic form in the predeter-
mined variables, following Backus and Driﬃll (1986) (see also Soederlind
(1999)),
ut = −F1tx1t, (13)
v(xt)=x
0
1tVtx1t + vt. (14)
Next, we rewrite the central bank’s optimisation problem of equation
(12) by substituting out the jump variables x2t, following Backus and Drif-
ﬁll (1986). This is achieved by deriving a relationship between the jump
variables on the one hand and the predetermined variables and the control
variable on the other, based on the expectations formation of private agents,
which is taken as given by the central bank. A linear relationship between
12
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expectations by private agents are formed,
x2t+1 = Ct+1x1t+1. (15)
F r o mt h eb o t t o mr o wo fe q u a t i o n s( 4 ) ,w eh a v et h a t
Etx2t+1 = A21(φ)x1t + A22(φ)x2t + B2ut. (16)
Moreover, equation (15) together with the top row of equation (4) yields
Etx2t+1 = Ct+1 [A11x1t + A12x2t + B1ut]. (17)
Combining equations (16) and (17) yields
x2t = Dt(φ)x1t + Gt(φ)ut, (18)
where
Dt(φ)=( A22(φ) − Ct+1A12)
−1(Ct+1A11 − A21(φ)), (19)
Gt(φ)=( A22(φ) − Ct+1A12)
−1(Ct+1B1 − B2). (20)
Using the form for the value function of equation (14), using equation (18)
to substitute out for the jump variables in terms of the predetermined and
control variables, and using the discrete approximation for the uniform prior
probability distribution, the central bank’s optimisation problem of equation
(12) may then be written as
x
0









t ut + u0
tU∗0










t x1t + B
j∗
t ut + εt+1)0Vt+1
(A
j∗
t x1t + B
j∗


















t are as given in the appendix, Eε
t denotes expectations over
the additive shocks, εt+1,a n dx1t is taken as given. Since the central bank’s
information set does not contain the degree of inﬂation inertia, the central
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x1t, we can write equation (21) as
x
0









t ut + u0
tU∗0




























The solution for the optimal feedback rule can then be derived from the




























Substituting the optimal feedback rule (see equations (13) and (25)) back
into the Bellman equation (24), and equating the terms quadratic in x1t then




























Private agents form expectations according to equations (16) and (17). Since
private agents are assumed to know the actual value of the degree of inﬂation
inertia, ¯ φ,w eh a v et h a t
x2t = Dt(¯ φ)x1t + Gt(¯ φ)ut. (27)
Together with equations (13) and (15), this implies that
Ct = Dt(¯ φ) − Gt(¯ φ)F1t. (28)
Since the decision problem has an inﬁnite horizon, the matrices may be
independent of time t, and we can search for a stationary solution by iterating
backwards in time on the set of coupled equations (25), (26) and (28) (see
the appendix for more technical details).
3.2 Results
The algorithm described in Section 3.1 is used to determine optimal monetary
policy in the presence of uncertainty about inﬂation inertia within the hybrid
14
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optimal monetary policy rule has the following form,
it = fgegt + fueut + fyyt−1 + fππt−1 . (29)
Coeﬃcients of the optimal monetary policy rule are shown in Figure 1 as
a function of uncertainty, ∆,a b o u ti n ﬂation inertia, for the uniform prior
distribution for φ over the interval [0.48−∆,0.48+ ∆], as described above.
Results are shown for λ
y =1and λ
i =0 .1. Figures 2 and 3 show the corre-
sponding impulse responses to cost-push shocks and real interest rate shocks.
We can see that in the presence of uncertainty, it is optimal for policy to re-
spond more aggressively than in the case of certainty to both cost-push and
real interest rate shocks. Cost-push shocks, eut, introduce an output-inﬂation
tradeoﬀ, and it is not optimal to perfectly oﬀset them in the period of the
shock. Since the transmission mechanism depends on the degree of inﬂation
inertia, the optimal policy response depends on φ. In the case of uncertainty,
it also depends on uncertainty about inﬂation inertia. The response to shocks
is more aggressive under uncertainty since a potentially high realization of
inﬂation inertia would imply that the eﬀect of cost-push shocks persists for
longer, possibly requiring greater output contractions in future, and leading
to an additional loss which is larger than the possible reduction in loss due
to a realization of φ b yt h es a m ea m o u n tb e l o wt h em e a n . I ti st h e r e f o r e
optimal to prevent shocks from entering the system to a greater extent by
reacting more aggressively to them initially.
In contrast to cost-push shocks, real interest rate shocks do not introduce
an output-inﬂation tradeoﬀ. When the degree of inﬂation inertia is certain,
and if the central bank only cares about inﬂation and output volatility, it
is therefore optimal to oﬀset real interest rate shocks in the period of the
shock. In that case, the optimal monetary policy response only depends
on the interest elasticity of demand, γ, but not on the degree of inﬂation
inertia. Consequently, uncertainty about inﬂation inertia does not aﬀect the
optimal policy response in that case. This is shown in Figure 4, where we
can see that the reaction to real interest rate shocks is certainty-equivalent
i nt h ec a s eo fλ
i =0 . However, uncertainty about the degree of inﬂation
inertia does aﬀect the optimal response to real interest rate shocks when the
central bank cares about interest rate volatility (λ
i 6=0 ), since it is then
no longer optimal to move interest rates in the period of the shock by the
amount required to perfectly oﬀset the real interest rate shock, since this
would introduce too much interest rate volatility. Since the transmission of
15
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inertia, uncertainty about inﬂation inertia aﬀects the optimal response to real
interest rate shocks, as shown in Figures 1 and 3. We ﬁnd that uncertainty
about inﬂation inertia increases the optimal reponse to real interest rate
shocks, but the response is still less aggressive than would be required to
perfectly oﬀset the shock.
Since cost-push shocks introduce an output-inﬂation tradeoﬀ,t h er e s u l to f
a more aggressive response to cost-push shocks carries over to the case when
the central bank cares only about inﬂation and output volatility, as can be
seen from Figure 4. If the central bank cares only about inﬂation volatility,
however, then policy is certainty-equivalent in the presence of uncertainty
about inﬂation inertia.
The results of a more aggressive response to both shocks for the case when
the central bank cares about interest rate volatility also hold if the central




i(it − it−1)2 in equation (10)), as shown in Figure 5.7
Moreover, in the cases where optimal policy is not certainty-equivalent,
we ﬁnd that inﬂation returns slightly more gradually to equilibrium following
a shock, with the speed of convergence decreasing with uncertainty about
inﬂation inertia. When the central bank cares only about inﬂation and output
gap volatility, the law of motion for inﬂation is given by
πt = ρππt−1 + hueut, (30)
where ρπ is the serial correlation of inﬂation.8 The more gradual return of
inﬂation to equilibrium under uncertainty following a cost-push shock can
be seen from Figure 6, which shows the serial correlation of inﬂation as a
function of the degree of uncertainty about inﬂation inertia. In the case when
the central bank also has a concern for interest rate volatility, the impulse
responses of inﬂation to cost-push shocks and real interest rate shocks shown
in Figures 2 and 3 illustrate that inﬂation returns slightly more gradually to
equilibrium under uncertainty than under certainty.
7Due to the concern for interest rate smoothing, the lagged interest rate is an additional
predetermined variable, and the optimal policy rule therefore also contains a feedback of
magnitude fi on the lagged interest rate.
8Note that the reduced-form serial correlation in inﬂation depends on the parameters
in the central bank’s objective function. Benati (2005) ﬁnds empirical support for a
dependence of reduced-form inﬂation persistence in the UK on the monetary policy regime.
16
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with the result of Söderström (2002), who ﬁnds that it is optimal for policy
to respond more aggressively to cost-push shocks when the central bank’s
objective function penalizes inﬂation and output volatility, but that the re-
sponse is certainty-equivalent if it only penalizes inﬂation volatility. Also as
in Söderström (2002), we ﬁnd that the optimal policy response to real inter-
est rate shocks is certainty-equivalent if the central bank cares only about
inﬂation volatility. However, our result of a certainty-equivalent response to
real interest rate shocks when the central bank cares about both inﬂation
and output volatility diﬀers from Söderström (2002), who ﬁnds that a more
aggressive response to demand shocks is optimal in that case. This diﬀer-
ence is probably due to the fact that Söderström (2002) considers a purely
backward-looking model, with somewhat diﬀerent timing assumptions than
the forward-looking model considered in this paper; in particular, he assumes
a lag of one period in the eﬀect of monetary policy on the ouput gap, while
no such lag in the transmission mechanism is present in the model considered
in this paper.
Our ﬁnding of a more aggressive response to real interest rate shocks when
the central bank also cares about interest rate volatility is in line with Kimura
and Kurozumi (2003)’s ﬁndings for optimal policy under commitment. Con-
sidering micro-founded models of inﬂation inertia and micro-founded loss
functions, with an added concern for interest rate volatility, they ﬁnd that
the optimal policy response to shocks to the natural real interest rate is more
aggressive in the presence of uncertainty about inﬂation inertia. We also ﬁnd
as in Kimura and Kurozumi (2003) that inﬂation returns slightly more grad-
ually to equilibrium following a real interest rate shock when the central bank
has a concern for interest rate volatility.
4 Conclusions
This paper studied optimal monetary policy under discretion with parame-
ter uncertainty about inﬂation inertia. Optimal policy rules and impulse
responses were presented within a hybrid New-Keynesian model estimated
for the euro area by Smets (2003).
We found that it may be optimal for policy to respond more aggressively
to cost-push shocks and real interest rate shocks in the presence of uncer-
tainty about inﬂation inertia, depending on the form of the central bank’s
17
ECB
Working Paper Series No. 540
November 2005objective function. If the central bank’s objective is to minimise inﬂation
and output gap volatility, and if it also has concern for interest rate volatility
or interest rate smoothing, then the optimal policy response to both cost-
push shocks and real interest rate shocks is more aggressive in the presence
of uncertainty about inﬂation inertia. If the central bank only cares about
inﬂation and output gap volatility, however, then the optimal policy response
to cost-push shocks is more aggressive in the presence of uncertainty about
inﬂation inertia, while the optimal response to real interest rate shocks re-
mains independent of such uncertainty. Finally, if the central bank’s objective
function only penalizes inﬂation volatility, then the optimal policy response
to both cost-push shocks and real interest rate shocks does not depend on
uncertainty about inﬂation inertia.
Moreover, in the cases where optimal policy is not certainty equivalent, we
found that inﬂation returns slightly more gradually to equilibrium following
a shock, with the speed of convergence decreasing with uncertainty about
inﬂation inertia.
In future research, it would be interesting to apply our method to study
optimal policy with uncertainty about endogenous inﬂation persistence in
larger estimated models used for monetary policy analysis, such as the model
of Smets and Wouters (2003) for the euro area, and in models with micro-
foundations for inﬂation inertia and micro-founded objective functions (see
Kimura and Kurozumi (2003), Gali and Gertler (1999), Woodford (2003),
Steinsson (2003), and Amato and Laubach (2003)).
This paper considered optimal monetary policy under discretion. While
optimal policy under commitment is desirable from a normative viewpoint
(see Woodford (1999)), there are contrasting views of various policy makers
and observers of how monetary policy is set in practice (see for example
Blinder (1998), Issing et al. (2001)). Further research on the implications
of inﬂation inertia for other approaches to setting monetary policy would
be useful. Moreover, this paper assumed that uncertainty about inﬂation
inertia is constant over time. In future research it would also be interesting

































































Here, the matrices Q and U have been partitioned conformably with x1t and
x2t.
As a criterion for convergence of the matrices in the value function iter-
ation, we choose the inﬁnity-norm,
kV k∞ =m a x
{k,l=1,..,n1}
|(Vt)kl − (Vt+1)kl|,
with a tolerance of 10−6. Initial conditions are chosen as a zero-matrix of size
n2xn1for Ct,a n da s0.01 times the unit matrix of size n1xn1 for Vt.E q u a t i n g
the remaining terms in the Bellman equation (24), which are not quadratic
in x1t , yields an expression for the additional term in the value function,
vt = β (tr [Vt+1Σ]+vt+1), (31)





is the covariance matrix of the shocks, as deﬁned
above. Given that a stationary solution for V was found, the stationary
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Figure 1: Coeﬃcients of optimal monetary policy rule, as a function of
uncertainty, ∆,a b o u ti n ﬂation inertia, with uniform prior distribution for φ
over the interval [0.48 − ∆,0.48 + ∆] ;f o r λ
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Figure 2: Impulse response to a unit cost-push shock, with uncertainty
about inﬂation inertia in the form of a uniform prior distribution for φ over
the interval [0.48 − 0.4,0.48 + 0.4] ;f o r λ
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Figure 3: Impulse response to a unit real interest rate shock, with uncer-
tainty about inﬂation inertia in the form of uniform prior distribution for φ
over the interval [0.48 − 0.4,0.48 + 0.4] ;f o r λ
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Figure 4: Coeﬃcients of optimal monetary policy rule without a concern
for interest rate volatility, as a function of uncertainty, ∆,a b o u ti n ﬂation
inertia, with a uniform prior distribution for φ over the interval [0.48 −
∆,0.48 + ∆];f o r λ
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Figure 5: Coeﬃcients of optimal monetary policy rule with a concern for
interest rate smoothing, rather than interest rate volatility, as a function of
uncertainty, ∆,a b o u ti n ﬂation inertia, with a uniform prior distribution for
φ over the interval [0.48 − ∆,0.48 + ∆];f o r λ
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Figure 6: Serial correlation of inﬂation, ρπ, as a function of uncertainty,
∆,a b o u ti n ﬂation inertia, for a uniform prior distribution for φ over the
interval [0.48 − ∆,0.48 + ∆] ;f o rλ
y =1 , λ
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